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Accountants and the Recovery Act
*
By C. Oliver Wellington
The national industrial recovery act and its administration
have a three-fold interest to professional accountants. First, as
citizens we must follow closely any movement which so greatly
affects business and the welfare of the nation; second, in our
professional capacities we shall be called upon to help trade asso
ciations in developing uniform cost-accounting systems and in
“policing” under the codes and trade-practice agreements; and,
third, our advice will be sought by clients as to what they should
do for their own best interests in reference to various activities
and proposals under the act.
Recently, some one who was rather disgusted with the situa
tion, stated that the initials N. R. A. stood for “Nuts Running
America.” While many of us are far from satisfied with the act,
and particularly some features of the administration of the act,
I believe a better meaning to us of the initials N. R. A. is “New
Responsibilities for Accountants.”
It will perhaps help to a clearer understanding of the present
situation if we review briefly some of the events leading up to the
passage of the recovery act. It was undoubtedly the intention of
the administration and congress to improve the rather serious
business and social condition of this country. Any discussion
as to causes of the depression reminds me of the tale of the three
men who were arguing as to which profession was the oldest.
The doctor mentioned the story of a rib having been taken from
Adam and turned into a woman, Eve, and asserted that this
operation was the earliest example of professional work. The
engineer, however, pointed out that the Good Book referred to the
world having been made in six days out of chaos, and that this,
the most wonderful engineering feat ever recorded, proved that
the engineering profession was the oldest. But the banker settled
the argument by merely asking the question, “Who created
chaos?”
The bankers are blamed for much of the trouble which we have
been through, and undoubtedly must share a considerable portion
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants at
New Orleans, October, 1933.
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of responsibility, but some of it at least must be laid at the door
of management engineers and cost accountants. Many of these
men, in advising individual manufacturing clients, have pointed
out that an increase in volume of production and sales beyond a
certain point would very substantially increase the net profit.
Many so-called “stop-loss charts” have been devised, showing a
point at which the production has absorbed all the overhead or
burden cost, and beyond which any production and sales at prices
above direct material and labor represented clear profit. With
such a chart it was very easy to demonstrate mathematically that
the client was well advised to take an increased volume of business
at any price greater than direct material and labor, as the regular
business had already absorbed the total burden.
This type of argument appeared sound on the surface, but
those making the argument and those applying it to actual busi
ness failed to reason out the effect of cutting prices to get the
increased volume. There often was an immediate gain but in
nearly every case it was merely temporary. Competitors who
saw an increasing share of business going to the concern which
cut prices promptly met the new prices, and usually went one step
further, so that the final result was practically the same volume
of business being done by all concerns in the industry but all of
them selling at a loss instead of a profit.
Unfortunately this idea, that volume in itself is a cure-all, still
prevails. The president of one of the large New York banks
within a year stated that the farmers needed better prices in order
to cure their ills, but that the manufacturers did not need better
prices but merely increased volume. The facts coming under my
observation, were quite the contrary. Manufacturing prices in
general were then so low that an increase in volume would merely
increase the total loss, and to save the manufacturing situation
there must be a definite improvement in the price level.
Some years ago I was privileged to see a clear illustration of the
results of the policy of attempting to get volume irrespective of
price. An accounting firm was employed to develop a uniform
cost-accounting plan for a group of paper mills, making similar
products. One mill out of the group had made a slight profit in
the depression year of 1921, when all the other mills showed losses.
In response to inquiries to determine the cause, the treasurer said
that the mill had four paper machines and, with the dropping off
in business at the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921, the com
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pany saw it would be impossible to get satisfactory business in
sufficient volume to run the mill at full capacity. Accordingly,
the management of this mill decided that it should become a two
machine mill. The people in charge would forget that they had
the other two machines. They would work out a careful budget
of operating expenses based on running two machines and, com
puting costs on that basis, would refuse to take any business the
price for which did not at least equal the cost.
The result of this policy was that, by considerable sales effort,
they were able to obtain sufficient business to run the two ma
chines most of the time, and they ended the year 1921 with a very
slight profit. On the other hand, those mills that attempted to
run all their paper machines full time all the year lost money, and
those that tried the hardest to run full time lost the most money,
in some cases running up into millions of dollars.
If all the mills in this industry had looked the situation in the
face and refused to make sales below cost, while the carrying
charges for unused capacity would undoubtedly have kept the
profit near a minimum, there would have been no large losses.
The policy they did follow of trying to run full time and pushing
on to the market a greater tonnage than could be consumed under
the then current business conditions left a heavy inventory hang
ing over the market, which had to be used up before prices could
get back to a reasonably profitable basis. This policy of at
tempting to run full time not only caused large losses in 1921 but
carried the losses forward and reduced the opportunity for profit
in the two succeeding years.
Another cause of the bad business situation is the increase in
the operation of the larger companies by “hired men,” who have
little or no ownership in the business. A man who is running a
business which he owns is vitally interested in net results, but a
man who is merely hired on a salary naturally attempts to make
a showing in his particular job. For example, the sales manager
properly considers it his job to get sales. If he succeeds and the
company still loses a large amount of money, he can always blame
the failure to earn net profits on the high costs in the factory.
In addition to the foregoing causes for the bad business situa
tion, the great expansion in plant capacity during the war period
caused many manufacturers to break into new markets in the
hope of utilizing part of this capacity. This served to unsettle
the price situation in industries which otherwise might have con45
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tinued to operate at some profit. Improvement in the situation
in many trades, which might have been made by cooperative
action, was restrained or prevented by fear of action on the part
of the government under the Sherman or Clayton acts.
The Sherman anti-trust act, as its name implies, was an attempt
to prevent the large trusts from crushing the small individual
competitor. It was never intended by congress to restrain busi
ness men in a trade from agreeing on reasonable trade practices
to stop unfair competition, but unfortunately such ideas have
been read into it by court decisions. The Clayton act, of a much
later date, prohibits various means of restraining competition.
The tendency of both these acts and decisions under them has
been to prevent business men from joining together to improve
trade conditions in their industry.
In considering the national industrial recovery act, it is very
important to bear in mind that this is a political law. While it is
true that all laws are political, this one is especially so. More
over, it is an attempt to serve two purposes in one act.
The country was faced with a large number of men out of work
and very low rates of wages being paid to those who were at work
in many industries; and it seemed essential, if we were to live
through this coming winter without serious social disturbances,
to develop a plan for unemployment relief. On the other hand,
most businesses had for a year, or two years, been operating at a
loss, and business was properly clamoring for some relief or some
change in the situation whereby it could, on the average, operate
at a profit. The first purpose, unemployment relief, led to the
introduction of the Black thirty-hour bill, and the second purpose
to agitation for the repeal of the Sherman and Clayton acts, in
order to allow business to stop by itself some of the unrestrained
competition which these laws not only encouraged but required.
The recovery act, therefore, attempts to carry out both purposes:
to give unemployment relief through shorter hours and generally
higher wages, and on the other hand to give employers the oppor
tunity of combining through trade associations to stop ruthless
competition and endeavor to restore each industry to a profitable
basis.
The recovery act has gone a long way in the right direction in
suspending temporarily the action of the Sherman and Clayton
acts, not only allowing business men to develop proper trade
practice agreements for a whole industry, but providing, through
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the licensing section of the recovery act, for the assistance of the
government in enforcing these trade practice agreements. With
proper administration, this act can go far in correcting some of
the competitive evils that have grown in intensity since the world
war.
The way of presenting the movement to the general public,
however, can be adversely criticized on account of the fact that
the administration has put the cart before the horse—it has at
tempted to put results ahead of causes. The administration has
stressed shorter hours, higher wages and greatly increased costs
of production, at the same time requesting business men not to
increase selling prices. Considering the fact that most businesses
have been operating for two years at substantial losses, we may
wonder where the administration expected the business men to
find the money with which to pay these increased costs.
The business man who fails to be carried away by “ballyhoo”
and insists on keeping his business going, is really rendering the
greatest service to the country, as his failure would throw more
people out of work. It is not the spectacular addition of em
ployees here and there that improves the whole situation, but a
more general and widespread increase of employment which
comes only with an improvement in business conditions.
Fundamentally the emphasis must be on profits. No business
man will enter into a transaction, buy materials or employ labor
unless he believes by so doing he will make a profit. He may be
incorrect in his judgment, and the result of the operation may
show a loss rather than a profit, but at the outset he hoped for and
planned to make a profit. I realize that during temporarily de
pressed conditions a man may consciously transact business at a
loss in order to keep a nucleus of his organization together pending
the restoration of more normal conditions, but such an expedient
can only be undertaken during a temporary depression and for
a comparatively short duration of time.
Granting that the stimulating force for business and an increase
of business is the hope of making profits, we see that the way to
improve conditions is to help and encourage the making of profits.
A manufacturer does not discharge employees on whose labor he
makes a profit, but on the contrary will add to his payroll and
keep on adding as long as he can make and sell goods at a profit.
On the other hand, if he can not sell goods at a profit, he will
either discharge workmen or reduce wages, or both, to reduce cost
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so that the goods that are made can be sold at a profit. If he can
not carry this process, plus a saving in expenses, to the point where
he does make a profit, he will eventually have to go out of busi
ness, throwing all his employees out of work.
The efforts of the administration, therefore, should be devoted
to helping to change trade conditions from a point where trans
actions result in losses to a point where transactions result in
gains, as every gain, no matter how small, builds up a fund out of
which further expenditures can be made, further transactions
undertaken and more labor employed. We need not worry about
excessive profits, as the normal forces of competition will keep
these down in practically every instance; and a large share of
really excess profits can properly be taken by the government
through taxes.
It is perhaps unnecessary for me to point out that the con
tinuation of the capitalistic system is dependent upon the opera
tion of businesses at a profit. We know that any one concern can
operate at a loss for only a comparatively short period before it
must cease entirely, but perhaps we do not realize fully that the
welfare of the nation is affected by the profit or loss of individual
concerns. It is only through the accumulation of profits of thou
sands of businesses, at a very large total of profits in excess of
losses, that the nation as a whole can continue. The business
man who makes a profit, not only helps himself but helps the
nation. On the other hand, the man who makes losses, not only
hurts himself but does double damage, as he also makes it more
difficult for his competitors to transact business at a profit.
There are three general causes for selling below cost: (1) igno
rance of costs, (2) the desire to attract profitable business through
the offer of one or more outstanding articles below cost, and (3) an
intention to make low prices so as to drive competitors out of
business, in the hope of recouping the losses through higher prices
after the competitors are gone.
Whichever one of these three causes may be controlling in a
certain case, the result is economically bad for the nation. From
the standpoint of the good of the whole country, it is much more
reasonable to prohibit by law the selling below cost than to re
strain so-called “profiteering.” High profits in themselves are
good for the whole nation rather than bad, and these high profits
can very fairly and properly be made the means of raising part of
the heavy taxes that are required at the present time and will
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undoubtedly be required for the next ten years. The excess
profits taxes, that we formerly had, yielded large sums to the
United States treasury up to 1920, and an excess-profits tax at the
present time at a much higher rate than 5 per cent. would un
doubtedly be popular.
Considering these fundamentals which will prevail as long as
we have a capitalistic system and allow any freedom of action to
the individual man, we can see that the greatest force for good
in the recovery act is the encouragement given trade groups to
govern themselves, eliminate unfair and unjust competitive prac
tices, and put the whole industry on a profitable basis. The
repeal of the Sherman and Clayton acts would have been of con
siderable help in this same direction; but the N. R. A. movement,
if properly directed, can go further, through its authority to
compel all members of an industry to conform to a reasonable
code of fair competition. Competition is not eliminated, but it is
put on a higher plane, whereby the industry as a whole makes
some return on the capital invested. It is this feature of the
N. R. A. movement which is most hopeful and valuable, and it
is the one that must be emphasized and helped by all intelligent
business and professional men.
Another feature of the administration of the recovery act which
seems open to considerable opposition, is the handling of the labor
situation. Although it is always true that there are increases in
strikes when a country begins to recover from a depression, the
wave of rather serious strikes which we have seen recently has
undoubtedly been stimulated by the false ideas which the recovery
administration has spread or at least has allowed to be spread.
While in most cases business men are willing to work in close
cooperation with the present heads of organized labor, the history
of labor unions in this country and others gives little assurance
that, when the unions once have full control, the present leaders
will not be deposed in favor of those much more radical, who can
be elected to office by promising all kinds of impossible things.
Few intelligent executives object to high wages and good working
conditions, but they do object to unreasonable operating rules
set by the union, which unfairly increase costs.
During recent years the federal trade commission has held
numerous trade-practice conferences at which business men have
joined together to work out plans for the good as a whole industry,
especially in restraining unfair competition through unsound
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methods of doing business. There were 52 conferences held by
the commission in the period from October, 1928, to January,
1932. Under the laws in force prior to the recovery act, however,
neither the federal trade commission nor the trade associations
could go very far in correcting a bad price situation. In general,
the federal trade commission considered as an unfair trade prac
tice, ‘‘the selling of goods below cost with the intent and with the
effect of injuring a competitor, or where the effect may be sub
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or
unreasonably restrain trade.” Selling below cost in itself was
not an unfair trade practice but, to make it unfair, a definite
intent or effect had to be proven.
Under the recovery act, many of the codes already filed go much
further than the federal trade commission practice conferences
and make it an unfair trade practice to sell below cost. In stating
this general policy, there is a great diversity of ideas and especially
of wording. The administration so far has not attempted to
establish any standard wording on this subject, but appears to
be interested primarily in having each group agree within itself.
Some of the code provisions refer to “reasonable cost,” others to
“cost to the seller,” “base price having regard to cost of manu
facturing,” “current weighted average cost of production,” and
still others to a “reasonable cost of production and distribution.”
One code refers to “cost as determined without any subterfuge
in accordance with sound accounting practice.” Several provide
for no sales below cost, several mention a return on the capital
invested as one item of cost, and some refer similarly to the use
of plant facilities as an item of cost. Some provide for a cost
determined on an average basis or an “average weighted cost,”
and some also provide that no sales shall be made below cost plus
a reasonable profit. The attitude of the administration appears
to be rather generally opposed to any provision requiring a profit
above cost and to any determination of costs on an average basis,
but the theory of prohibiting sales below the individual cost of
each business unit seems to have substantial support.
With this development of codes and trade practice agreements
under the codes it is especially important to know what is cost.
There is here a great responsibility and opportunity for account
ants to work with individual clients, trade associations and the
federal administration to guide along sound lines the thoughts and
the wording of any agreement. It seems to me that it is especially
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important that any reference to cost must be to a total delivered
cost. Any consideration of cost which is limited to “cost at the
plant,” “manufacturing cost” or some similar phrase will defeat
the purposes of the agreements, which are, fundamentally, to
put the business as a whole on a profitable basis and to prevent
one company from injuring not only itself but the whole industry
by selling below its cost. Cost should be the total cost delivered
to the customer, and no item of cost or expense should be allowed
to be overlooked.
After an agreement is designed to cover total cost, there is still
much work to be done. The total cost means little in actual
practice unless a company is making merely one product. If,
as in the average case, there are several products, it is necessary
for the industry to agree upon the best method of allocation of the
costs and expenses to the different products made and sold. I can
not emphasize too strongly that no one method of allocation can
be arbitrarily used to fit all expenses in one company or one in
dustry and, especially, that no general plan can be applied to
several industries. It is essential that each trade develop a
uniform cost accounting plan which is sound in principle and
practical in operation, so that under it cost elements will be
handled by each company in the same way, costs can be compared,
and “policing” of costs and selling prices can be conducted in a
practical manner. It is not necessary nor desirable that any two
trades have exactly the same cost-accounting plan, but the way
in which costs are built up should be so clearly defined that it will
be possible to reconcile the costs of two or more industries, espe
cially those which may compete with each other.
This emphasis on uniform costs obviously does not apply to
uniform books, sheets, cards or other records, but only to the
classification of accounts, the resulting uniform analyses of ex
penses and in general to the principles and methods of building
up the costs.
It is hardly necessary to point out that determination of cost
on a proper basis for an industry will be of great value to that in
dustry in its contacts with labor, the government and the general
public. Facts when known give a sound basis for correcting any
injustices there may be, and, on the other hand, if a condition is
reasonable, it will be proven so by the cost figures.
In helping trade associations to work out uniform cost-account
ing plans, there are certain questions of principle on which there
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may be some difference of opinion. Shall there, for example, be
included in costs, or in the cost calculations, any provision for a
return on the capital used or on the plant facilities? Shall the
cost as developed be actual cost or shall it be normal cost; and if
the latter, shall we use as a normal a fair average of production
for the industry or some other basis? Shall there be a separate
classification for administrative expenses, or shall such expenses
be analyzed and those that are primarily manufacturing be in
cluded with manufacturing costs, and those that are primarily
selling be included with the selling costs? Shall depreciation be
included on the basis of replacement values of the plant assets or
on cost of the assets or some combination of the two? Shall
depreciation be at uniform rates for all plants in an industry?
How shall we reconcile the different practices of different concerns
as to handling expenses for repairs, upkeep, etc.?
These questions are not intended to be an exhaustive list of
what must be considered. They merely illustrate the kind of
questions to be discussed and perhaps demonstrate that the prob
lems of developing a proper uniform cost system for an industry
are far from simple.
The attitude of many business men toward the national re
covery act and its administration is influenced by the fact that
this is emergency legislation. While one may point out that
Great Britain has experienced an improvement in business condi
tions without having anything similar to the recovery act and may
feel that today we would be much better off if the act had never
been passed, it is nevertheless true that we have gone too far to
retrace our steps completely. The emergency phases of the
situation will gradually pass, let us hope more quickly than now
seems possible, but undoubtedly the idea of restraint on unre
stricted competition will continue in some form or another and
we shall continue to have greater control over business on the
part of the government.
The present administration has again and again stated that
many things done are frankly experimental and will be changed if
they do not work, so it is obviously the part of wisdom for business
men, instead of sitting on the sidelines and watching develop
ments and criticizing lack of results, to take an active part in the
movement and to influence it in the right direction. It seems to
me that the recovery act gives business men a wonderful oppor
tunity to do what they have hoped to do or endeavored to do over
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the last ten or twenty years, namely, exercise some control over
competitive conditions in their own industry. It is now possible
for each trade to govern itself in a sensible way.
Unless a trade succeeds in governing itself, the administration
will be forced to step in and exercise more direct control. There
is nothing in the history of government control of railroads in this
country or in government control of business in any country,
which would lead us to look with any satisfaction on such a plan
other than as a make-shift to be succeeded as promptly as possible
by business control over itself. Therefore, business men are well
advised to move—and to move promptly—toward exercise of
that proper control through trade associations. I do not know of
any activity at the present moment that can more reasonably
call upon the time and energy of the principal executives of each
business than assistance in building the code and trade practice
agreements for their industries. They are not only in that way
helping the industry toward an immediate improvement in its
financial condition but are also building a sound foundation for
the future.
It is not necessary for business men to wait for the acceptance
of a code by the administration before putting into effect the
trade-practice agreements for the industry. If sound trade
practice agreements are developed and receive the approval of a
large majority in the industry, they can by mutual consent be put
into effect immediately, with the knowledge that if they are sound
they will eventually be approved by the administration and if not
they can be amended at a later date. Too many business men are
making the mistake of holding off and deferring the benefit they
could have now through trade-association activity. They are
waiting for the administration to push action on the code and then
further push them to do what they should be eager to do for them
selves without any pressure from the administration.
We should urge all clients who are not in a trade association to
join one, or to form one if there is none already formed, and to
work effectively to strengthen the association and make it active
and aggressive in the interest of its members. We must em
phasize the fact that the government will look after the interests of
labor and of consumers, but business men must look after them
selves.
Our clients must have in mind that an unreasonable increase in
operating costs and resulting selling prices may drive the whole
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industry out of competition. We must remember that the gov
ernment can not control the consumer. He will buy what he
desires. If the price of coal is pushed too high, people will heat
their houses by oil or by gas. There are very few products for
which substitutes can not be found if the price goes too high. It
is, therefore, essential that each industry watch its own problems
carefully and refuse to be driven into a situation where all or a
majority of its members will have to close down, throwing large
numbers out of employment.
It is particularly important that our clients be not unduly in
fluenced by the publicity that is sent out from Washington.
Catchy phrases of high-priced publicity men can not change sound
economic laws. It is only as the profits exceed the losses that the
nation can go ahead, and these profits must be profits made by
thousands of individual businesses. We need not worry about
excessive profits, as immense sums will be required for taxation,
and unreasonable profits in any one industry quickly invite in
creased competition.
Many features of the N. R. A. movement are fundamentally
sound and will prevail after the present ballyhoo is ended. With
out a doubt greater government control of business is far from a
temporary policy. It will probably continue for many years.
Realizing this, it is the duty of business and professional men to
lend their influence to steer this movement in the right direction
and to see that the maximum permanent benefit is obtained,
not only for each individual concern and for each trade association
but for the country at large.
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